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CIVIL PROCEDURE-ARKANSAS RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
53(b)-AN END TO THE USE OF SPECIAL REFEREES IN ARKANSAS.
Hutton v. Savage, 298 Ark. 256, 769 S.W.2d 394 (1989) and Arkansas
Department of Human Services v. Templeton, 298 Ark. 390, 769
S.W.2d 404 (1989).
In December 1984 Arkansas Social Services requested court-
ordered supervision of the home environment of the two children of
Michael and Charlene Hutton of Benton County.' The juvenile court
judged the children dependent-neglected,2 and over the next three
years, the court entered at least thirteen orders concerning the chil-
dren's welfare.'
On January 20, 1987, the Arkansas Supreme Court decided in
Walker v. Arkansas Department of Human Services 4 that the juvenile
court system was unconstitutional.' This decision abolished the juve-
nile court system that county judges had administered since 1911,6
and that had been revised only once, in 1975.1 In response, the Gen-
eral Assembly, which was in regular session on the date of the Walker
1. Hutton v. Savage, 298 Ark. 256, 258, 769 S.W.2d 394, 395 (1989).
2. A dependent-neglected child is one whose parent is unfit to properly care for the juve-
nile or who fails or refuses to provide care necessary for the juvenile's health and well being.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-303(4) (1987).
3. 298 Ark. at 258, 769 S.W.2d at 395.
4. 291 Ark. 43, 722 S.W.2d 558 (1987). The Walkers, parents of two children who had
been declared dependent-neglected by the Pulaski County Juvenile Court, appealed the loss of
custody over their children. They argued that the county court's jurisdiction over juvenile
matters was unconstitutional because the Arkansas Constitution did not authorize a juvenile
court. Id. at 45, 722 S.W.2d at 559.
5. Id. at 47, 722 S.W.2d at 560. The court ruled that the state constitution allowed the
legislature to establish only certain specified courts, such as municipal and chancery courts.
The authority to create a new court lay solely in the Arkansas Constitution, and the constitu-
tion did not mention a juvenile court. In its decision, the court overruled Ex parte King, 141
Ark. 213, 217 S.W. 465 (1919), which upheld vesting jurisdiction over juvenile matters in the
county courts. 291 Ark. at 49, 722 S.W.2d at 561.
6. The first juvenile court in the United States, the Juvenile Court of Cook County, be-
gan in 1899 in Chicago, Illinois. A national trend followed, and by 1909 nineteen more states
had juvenile courts. H.H. Lou, JUVENILE COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES 19 (1972). Ar-
kansas followed two years later and established "The Juvenile Court" in Act 215 of 1911. Act
of Apr. 25, 1911, No. 215, 1911 Ark. Acts 166.
7. In 1975 the legislature adopted a new Arkansas Juvenile Code that abolished the use
of referees who were not lawyers. Act of March 18, 1975, No. 451, 1975 Ark. Acts 1179
(codified at ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-401 to 454 (Supp. 1985) (repealed by Act of 1989, No.
273 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 9-27-301 to 345 (Supp. 1989))). A "grandfather" clause,
however, protected those nonlawyer county judges and referees functioning as juvenile judges
at the time. The Act gave unusual power to the referees by making their decisions binding on
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decision, passed "Act 14 of 19878 which established juvenile divisions
of the existing trial courts.9 The Act allowed those courts to continue
using masters or referees'" to hear juvenile cases. I I
As a result, the Huttons' case was transferred to the Benton
County Probate Court.'2 In May 1988 the juvenile master entered an
order finding that the custody of the children should remain with the
Department of Human Services (DHS). The Huttons appealed and
argued that the master exceeded his authority because he had not
made a recommendation to the judge but had issued the final order
himself.'3 The supreme court accepted their argument, voided the
master's order, and held that it was beyond the constitutional power
of the legislature to grant judges the authority to appoint masters who
could exercise the judge's full authority. 14 In its decision, the court
also relied on Rule 5315 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure
(ARCP) which allows reference to a master only in exceptional cir-
cumstances.16 The court upheld the right of the legislature to extend
circuit and probate court jurisdiction to juvenile matters. '7 Hutton v.
Savage, 298 Ark. 256, 769 S.W.2d 394 (1989).
Two weeks after the Hutton decision, the Arkansas Supreme
Court ruled on the appeal of a youth adjudicated delinquent"8 by the
the county judges who had to sign any referee decision as a decision of the county court. ARK.
CODE ANN. § 9-27-310 (1987).
8. Act of Feb. 6, 1987, No. 14, 1987 Ark. Acts 24 (Act 273 of 1989 provided that Act 14
would be effective until Aug. 1, 1989, at which time Act 273, codified at ARK. CODE ANN.
§§ 9-27-301 to 345, would go into effect).
9. 1987 Ark. Acts, No. 14, § 10. This placed delinquency jurisdiction in circuit court,
and dependency neglect and juveniles in need of supervision jurisdiction in probate court. The
legislature also voted to place a proposed constitutional amendment on the November 1988
ballot to authorize the General Assembly to create an entirely new juvenile court system.
ARK. COMM'N ON JUVENILE JUSTICE, JUVENILE COURTS IN ARKANSAS 6 (1989).
10. ARK. R. CIV. P. 53(a) states in part: "As used in this rule, the word-'master' includes
a referee, an auditor, an examiner, a commissioner and an assessor."
11. 1987 Ark. Acts, No. 14, § 8. The masters no longer had the authority to issue final
orders, but had to make referrals to the judges of their courts. Id. at § 6.
12. 298 Ark. at 258, 769 S.W.2d at 395.
13. Id. at 257, 769 S.W.2d at 395.
14. Id. at 265, 769 S.W.2d at 399.
15. ARK. R. CIV. P. 53(b) states in part: "A reference to a master shall be the exception
and not the rule .... Except in matters of account ... a reference shall be made only upon a
showing that some exceptional condition requires it."
16. 298 Ark. at 265, 769 S.W.2d at 399.
17. Id. at 268, 769 S.W.2d at 400.
18. A delinquent juvenile is one who has committed an act, other than a traffic offense,
which would involve the criminal laws of the state if committed by an adult. ARK. CODE
ANN. § 9-27-303(2) (1987).
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order of a juvenile master committing the boy to reform school. 19
Following Hutton, the court held that the juvenile referee unconstitu-
tionally exceeded his authority by performing acts properly exercised
only by the circuit judge. The court also repeated its warning against
reference to a master except in exceptional circumstances. 20
Two days later, the court delivered the death blow to the use of
referees acting as judges.2' In March 1989, the DHS sought to gain
permanent custody of a dependent-neglected, abused child from her
parents in Craighead County.22 Craighead County Circuit Judge
Templeton turned the case over to the juvenile master because of
scheduling conflicts. 23 At the same time, there were four DHS cus-
tody cases in Benton County scheduled for review. Circuit Judge
Keith referred the cases to the juvenile referee because he would be
unavailable and because the referee was most familiar with their facts
and previous history. 25 The DHS immediately requested writs of
mandamus contending that both judges, by referring the cases to spe-
cial masters, had violated Rule 53 and had not followed Hutton.2 6
The supreme court agreed and ruled that any attempt to use Rule 53
to justify using masters in juvenile courts was flatly contrary to law.27
The immediate reaction to the decision was the discontinuation of the
masters statewide, 28 and of one master by the State Judicial Depart-
ment used in foster care cases. 2 9 Arkansas Department of Human
Services v. Templeton, 298 Ark. 390, 769 S.W.2d 404 (1989).
There is a long tradition of using masters in courts of equity,
dating back to the reign of King Henry VIII.30 Early American use
followed the English pattern, with courts calling upon a master (or
19. Collins v. State, 298 Ark. 390, 769 S.W.2d 402 (1989).
20. Id.
21. Arkansas Dep't of Human Services v. Templeton, 298 Ark. 390, 769 S.W.2d 404
(1989).
22. Pierce v. Yates, No. P-JD-89-19 (Craighead County P. Ct. filed Mar. 18, 1989).
23. 298 Ark. at 392, 769 S.W.2d at 405.
24. Lutke v. St. Pierre, No. JP-88-20-2 (Benton County P. Ct. filed Mar. 28, 1989); N.W.
Ark. SCAN v. Jenkins, No. JP-88-6-2 (Benton County P. Ct. filed Mar. 28, 1989); Lutke v.
Shaw, No. JP-87-6-2 (Benton County P. Ct. filed Mar. 28, 1989); and State v. Shaffer, No. JP-
87-90-2 (Benton County P. Ct. filed Mar. 28, 1989).
25. 298 Ark. at 392, 769 S.W.2d at 405.
26. Id. at 391, 769 S.W.2d at 404.
27. Id. at 394, 769 S.W.2d at 406.
28. Telephone interview with Alice Holcomb, Pulaski County Chancery Clerk (June 15,
1989).
29. Telephone interview with J.D. Gingerich, Executive Secretary, Arkansas Judicial De-
partment (June 20, 1989).
30. 1 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 416 (7th ed. rev. 1956).
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auditor, examiner, or referee, as they were variously called) 3' in issues
involving complex or tedious fact findings, frequently in cases con-
cerning finances.3 2 The master traditionally assumed a noncontrover-
sial role, confining himself to specific issues and having no judicial
discretion.33
In the nineteenth century masters assumed greater responsibili-
ties in equity proceedings in addition to that of fact finding. The
master would settle pretrial disputes, take evidence, and submit find-
ings and recommendations to the trial judge for review and
determination.34
After the establishment of juvenile courts, 35 chancery masters
were employed to serve in the parens patriae3 6 function of those
courts. Chancery court responsibilities traditionally included protect-
ing the property and estates of children. The courts considered it a
natural step to extend such responsibility to the protection of the in-
terests of children themselves, who needed assistance.37 Such use of
masters relieved a judge of routine cases and resulted in a more con-
sistent application of justice. 38 The juvenile master would be a father-
figure/judge, representing both the state and the child. Proceedings
would be civil, not criminal, and premised on protection, not punish-
ment of the child.39 As a result, courts throughout the United States,
including Arkansas, used such masters to hear a large percentage of
the cases in juvenile courts.'
A serious consequence of the expanded and more unrestricted
use of masters was the abdication of power reserved to the judiciary.
Due in part to the court procedures of the time, this abdication of
power was prevalent in the nineteenth century, and still lingers today.
Before 1913 equity cases in the federal courts were cumbersome and
31. Cruz v. Hauck, 515 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1975). The practice was to refer to an exam-
iner to take evidence, or to a master to make recommendations to the court. Id. at 328.
32. Brazil, Referring Discovery Tasks to Special Masters: Is Rule 53 a Source ofAuthority
and Restrictions?, 1983 AMER. B. FOUND. RES. J. 143, 150 (1983).
33. Id. at 151.
34. Rubin, Between Recommendations and Orders: The Limbo Status of Juvenile Court
Referees, 27 CRIME & DELINQ. 317, 320 (1981).
35. See supra note 6.
36. Parens patriae describes the state's role of guardianship of persons under legal disabil-
ity. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1003 (5th ed. 1979).
37. Rubin, supra note 34, at 320-21.
38. Id.
39. ARK. COMM'N ON JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 3.
40. For examples of the use of referees in selected jurisdictions in the United States, see
Rubin, supra note 34, at 319.
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protracted.4' Procedure consisted of a highly ritualized and lengthy
series of evidentiary events 42 directed at building a record sufficient to
allow the court to enter a judgment at a final hearing.43 These eviden-
tiary events were so involved that judges often took no part in them.
Masters presided almost exclusively over the tedious process of devel-
oping the evidentiary record.' This produced a record so compre-
hensive that the court's "final hearing" frequently was no more than a
brief review of the work done and conclusions already drawn.45
The situation was similar in state courts. A judge could easily
forego his review of the master's work and leave all decision making
to the master.46 Many judges did exactly that.47 To many, this casual
approach to the use of masters was not only contrary to the spirit of
judicial administration, but an infringement on the right of a party to
be heard by a fully competent magistrate. After a hearing by a ref-
eree, parties often feared an inadequate or perfunctory review by the
judge, if there was any review at all.4"
As early as 1889, the United States Supreme Court acknowl-
edged the abdication of judicial power caused by the use of masters.49
Though the use (or misuse) of masters may raise constitutional ques-
tions, the Supreme Court has consistently rejected this line of argu-
ment. In Kimberly v. Arms50 the Court held that a master's findings
were presumed correct. In Crowell v. Benson 5 the Court refused to
hold that "determinations of fact in constitutional courts shall be
made by judges."'52
Before the rules of procedure took effect, many courts relied on
their "inherent power" to delegate certain powers to others. In 1920
41. Brazil, supra note 32, at 151.
42. Id. at 152. These included taking testimony from witnesses and parties, responding to
interrogatories, and producing documents.
43. Id. at 151.
44. Id. at 152.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 151.
47. U.S. Senior Judge Hubert L. Will of Chicago reminisced "[i]n my young days every
circuit and county judge had a special master appointed, and it wasn't even necessary to hold
hearings on his final recommendation." The result, Will said, was to "relieve[ed] the judge of
his burden and make the master some money." Strasser, On Orders from the Court, 13 STU-
DENT LAWYER, Jan. 1985, at 24, 26.
48. Rubin, supra note 34, at 332.
49. Kimberly v. Arms, 129 U.S. 512 (1889). "[A court] cannot ... abdicate its duty to
determine by its own judgment the controversy presented, and devolve that duty on any of its
officers." Id. at 524.
50. 129 U.S. 512 (1889).
51. 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
52. Id. at 51.
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the Supreme Court affirmed this exercise of inherent power in Ex
parte Peterson.53 A trial court appointed a master to help the court
organize a case at law involving some 700 different items of account.54
Writing for the Court, Justice Brandeis acknowledged that the trial
court had no statutory power to appoint the master.5 ' He then stated
that, absent legislation to the contrary, courts have an inherent power
"to appoint persons unconnected with the court to aid judges in the
performance of specific judicial duties.... 6 The Court ruled that
the inherent power to "invoke such aid is the same whether the court
sits in equity or at law.""7 State courts in Ohio 58 and New Mexico59
have also upheld the inherent power doctrine.
Cases challenging the use of masters have been made on three
grounds: reference without constitutional authority, abdication of ju-
dicial power, or abuse of Rule 53. Challenges to masters in Arkansas
generally have relied on the first ground. In a 1931 case, a taxpayer
challenged the quorum court's authority to appoint a master.' The
Arkansas Supreme Court found that the master, although nominally
only an advisor to thd quorum court, was in fact functioning as a
deputy probate judge. The state constitution, said the court, did not
authorize a second probate judgeship.61
In 1948 heirs contesting a will 62 asserted that Act 448 of 1941,63
which authorized a Referee in Probate to admit wills to probate, was
contrary to the state constitution.' Section 4 of Act 448 provided
that, absent a petition for review, the order of the Referee in Probate
53. 253 U.S. 300 (1920).
54. Id. at 306-07.
55. Id. at 309.
56. Id. at 312.
57. Id. at 314.
58. McCann v. Maxwell, 173 Ohio St. 282, 189 N.E.2d 143 (1963). The Ohio Supreme
Court relied on Peterson to justify appointments of master commissioners to hear and prepare
findings and conclusions of law.
59. State v. Doe, 93 N.M. 621, 603 P.2d 731 (Ct. App. 1979). An appeals court held that
a Children's Court rule requiring prior supreme court approval for the appointment of a spe-
cial master limited the inherent power of a district court to make such appointments, and
quoted Peterson in its decision. Id. at 624, 603 P.2d at 734.
60. Rose v. Brickhouse, 182 Ark. 1105, 34 S.W.2d 472 (1931).
61. Id. at 1109, 34 S.W.2d at 474.
62. Jansen v. Blissenbach, 214 Ark. 755, 217 S.W.2d 849 (1949).
63. Act of April 3, 1941, No. 448, 1941 Ark. Acts 1298 (codified at ARK. STAT. ANN.
§§ 22-508 to 511 (1947)).
64. ARK. CONST., art. VII, § 34 states in part that "[T]he Judge of the court having juris-
diction in matters of equity shall be the judge of the court of probate, and have ... exclusive
original jurisdiction in matters relative to the probate of wills . .. ."
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"shall become final as if performed by the Chancellor."6 The court
ruled that the effect of allowing a referee's order to become final, even
by default, created a second or deputy judge.66 Because article VII
provided for only one probate judge, the legislature could not consti-
tutionally grant such power to a referee.67
In 1975 a Washington County mother appealed a juvenile ref-
eree's custody decision,68 asserting that the appointment of the referee
was an unconstitutional delegation of judicial power and that the cre-
ation of the juvenile court was also unconstitutional.6 9 The supreme
court relied on Ex parte King (which Walker would overrule) to up-
hold the creation of the juvenile court.70 Because a lawfully created
court appointed him, the referee, though irregularly and possibly un-
constitutionally appointed, was a de facto officer whose acts were as
binding on the public as those of a de jure officer.7
The appointment of masters has also been challenged in other
jurisdictions. Courts in Delaware, 72 Indiana,7 and West Virginia 74
concluded that such appointments were an improper legislative grant
of judicial power. The highest courts in Nevada75 and Colorado 76
65. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 22-511 (1947).
66. 214 Ark. at 760, 217 S.W.2d at 850.
67. Id.
68. Fortin v. Parrish, 258 Ark. 277, 524 S.W.2d 236 (1975), overruled, 298 Ark. 256, 769
S.W.2d 394 (1988).
69. Id. at 279, 524 S.W.2d at 237.
70. Id. at 283, 524 S.W.2d at 240; (citing Exparte King, 141 Ark. 213, 217 S.W.2d 465
(1919)).
71. 258 Ark. at 287, 524 S.W.2d at 242.
72. A.L.W. v. J.L.W., 416 A.2d 708 (Del. 1980). The Delaware Supreme Court held that
the state law giving a family court master authority to enter a final order binding the court was
an impermissible delegation of judicial power. Id. at 711.
73. State ex rel Smith v. Starke Cir. Ct., 275 Ind. 483, 417 N.E.2d 1115 (1981). The
Indiana Supreme Court rejected the creation of master commissioners who could exercise full
jurisdiction over probate, civil and criminal matters if so empowered by a judge of their court.
The court said that the authority to make binding orders was one of the essential elements of
judicial power. It was impermissible to grant a master, who is only an instrumentality to
inform and assist the court, the power to make binding orders. Id. at 494, 417 N.E.2d at 1121.
74. Starcher v. Crabtree, 348 S.E.2d 293 (W. Va. 1986). The West Virginia Supreme
Court held unconstitutional the state legislature's attempt to divest the circuit courts of all
original jurisdiction in divorce and other family matters and place the jurisdiction in the hands
of a newly created family law master. Id. at 295.
75. Russell v. Thompson, 96 Nev. 830, 619 P.2d 537 (1980). The supreme court said that
where "the trial court made a general reference of nearly all of the contested issues, giving the
master the authority to decide substantially all issues in the case, as well as be the fact finder,
the trial court's function has been reduced to that of a reviewing court." Id. at 834, 619 P.2d
at 539. The court also scourged the judge. "[T]his type of blanket delegation approaches an
unallowable abdication by a jurist of his constitutional responsibilities and duties." Id.
76. Gelfond v. Dist. Ct., 2d Judicial Dist., 180 Colo. 95, 504 P.2d 673 (1972). In a di-
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harshly denounced appointments of special masters by trial courts as
an abdication of judicial power.
The widespread popularity of masters was partly because early
rules of equity placed no restrictions on their use. 7 However, by the
early 1900s there was a growing dissatisfaction with all aspects of eq-
uity procedure. A reform movement proposed the Rules of Practice
for the Courts of Equity of the United States in 1912 which resulted in
substantial changes in procedure. 7  The rules prohibited judges from
routinely referring to masters, forced judges to take more responsibil-
ity at trial, and reduced the role of masters in equity proceedings.79
An amendment to the Equity Rules in 1912 introduced the concept of
"exceptional condition."80 In 1938 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
53 consolidated various equity rules including the "exceptional condi-
tion" requirement.8 " The present federal rule is substantially the same
as the 1938 rule. 2
Rule 53 says nothing about what qualifies as an "exceptional
condition. 8s3 The vagueness of the term would allow "abundant, if
not infinite, flexibility and room for interpretation."8 4 Courts guided
by this open-ended language have generally interpreted the "excep-
tional condition" criterion on an ad hoc basis.8" For example, until
1957 courts were split over the question of whether crowded court
calendars qualified as "exceptional conditions."
8 s6
The Supreme Court settled this issue in 1957 in the seminal Rule
53 decision, La Buy v. Howes Leather Co. 1 7 In La Buy a trial judge
vorce case, the supreme court pointedly castigated the trial judge for abdication of duties:
"The trial court's order.., in effect delegated the decision making, as well as the fact finding,
function to the Master. In doing so, the judge abdicated his constitutional responsibilities and
duties." Id. at 100, 504 P.2d at 675.
77. Cruz v. Hauck, 515 F.2d 322, 329 (5th Cir. 1975) (citing Equity R. 73-88, 42 U.S. (1
How.) lxiv-lxvii (1842)).
78. For examples of changes in equity rules, see Brazil, supra note 32, at 153.
79. Id.
80. Id. (citing Equity R. 59, 226 U.S. 666 (1912)).
81. Brazil, supra note 32, at 153.
82. Id. Rule 53 states in part that "in actions to be tried without a jury... a reference [to
a master] shall be made only upon a showing that some exceptional condition requires it."
FED. R. Civ. P. 53(b) (emphasis added).
83. See Wald, "Some Exceptional Condition"-The Anatomy of a Decision Under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 53(b), 62 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 405, 406 (1988).
84. Brakel, Special Masters in Institutional Litigation, 1979 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 543,
550 (1979).
85. Kaufman, Masters in the Federal Courts: Rule 53, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 455
(1958).
86. Id.
87. 352 U.S. 249 (1957).
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referred two consolidated antitrust cases to a master over the objec-
tions of the litigants. He did so on the grounds of an "extremely con-
gested calendar" and "exception [sic] conditions.""8 The Supreme
Court affirmed a grant of mandamus to vacate the references.8 9 The
Court rejected congested dockets, extended trials, and complexity of
issues of fact and law as exceptional conditions warranting reference
to a master.9" The Court, in fact, declared that complexity of issues
was "an impelling reason for trial before a regular, experienced trial
judge rather than before a temporary substitute appointed on an ad
hoc basis and ordinarily not experienced in judicial work." 91
While rejecting certain circumstances as exceptional, the Court
nevertheless made no mention of what it would consider as "excep-
tional conditions" under Rule 53. However, implicit in its decision
was the requirement to rigidly apply Rule 53 and to view nonjury
references with disfavor. 92
Arkansas first relied on La Buy in State v. Nelson.93 In a tax-
payer's suit against several oil companies for conspiracy to fix
prices,94 the Pulaski County Chancery Court appointed a special
master against the litigants' wishes.95 The supreme court held that
the trial court's order was unauthorized and that length of trial, com-
plexity, and calendar congestion would not be grounds in Arkansas
for "the virtual displacement of the court by a special master. 96
In 1988 the supreme court heard Gipson v. Brown,97 an in-
trachurch financial dispute in which the trial court had appointed a
special master. While the refusing to interfere absent fraud or collu-
sion, in "purely ecclesiastical matters, ' 98 the court did address the
reference to a special master, holding that Nelson and ARCP 53(b)
forbid such use without a showing of some exceptional condition. 99
Other jurisdictions have also grappled with the difficulties in in-
terpreting the "exceptional condition" required of Rule 53. Courts in
88. Id. at 253.
89. Id. at 260.
90. Id. at 259.
91. Id.
92. Kaufman, supra note 85, at 456.
93. 246 Ark. 210, 438 S.W.2d 33 (1969).
94. Id. at 212-13, 438 S.W.2d at 36.
95. Id. at 218-19, 438 S.W.2d at 40.
96. Id. at 219, 221, 438 S.W.2d at 40.
97. 295 Ark. 371, 749 S.W.2d 297 (1988).
98. Id. at 376, 749 S.W.2d at 299.
99. Id.
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Iowa,"° Colorado,'' and Nevada ° 2 have all opted for a narrow inter-
pretation of what qualifies as an "exceptional condition."
In Hutton v. Savage' 3 the Arkansas Supreme Court faced the
question of reference to a master without constitutional authority.
The Huttons had argued that the juvenile master acted in excess of
the powers granted to him and that jurisdiction over dependent ne-
glected juveniles was not a constitutionally permissible function of the
probate courts."°0
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Jack Holt, Jr.,0" agreed
that the juvenile master had exceeded his authority.1 0 6 The funda-
mental issue was whether the probate court had the right to vest in a
master the power to preside over all juvenile cases. The supreme
court concluded that legislation permitting such use of masters in ju-
venile matters contravened the delegation of judicial powers and du-
ties allowed by the Arkansas Constitution. As such, it was an
unauthorized grant of legislative authority. 107
The court then addressed the permissible use of special masters,
even though none of the parties to the suit raised the issue at trial.'0
The court noted that section 6 of Act 14 of 1987 provided that the
referee shall submit recommendations to the judges and that only the
judge, not the referee, had the authority to issue a final order. 0 9
With that as a background, the court finely scrutinized the
master's order and the court record in Hutton. Nowhere did the
100. Iowa Pub. Serv. Co. v. Sioux City, 252 Iowa 380, 382, 107 N.W.2d 109, 110 (1961). A
trial court appointed a master in a utility rate case on the grounds that such cases were ex-
tremely complicated and involved extensive testimony. The supreme court held that the com-
plex issues and length of trial did not constitute exceptional conditions requiring a reference.
Id. at 387, 107 N.W.2d at 113.
101. Gelfond v. Dist. Ct., 2d Judicial Dist., 180 Colo. 95, 504 P.2d 673 (1972). See also
supra note 76 and accompanying text. A trial court made a reference in a pending divorce
because of complex issues concerning the parties' property and assets. One party appealed and
suggested that the court reject the reference to a master because "La Buy (La Buy v. Howes
Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957)) [is] a complete answer to all of the arguments advanced by
the respondents." 180 Colo. at 99, 504 P.2d at 674. The court agreed saying that "[tihe rule is
made absolute." Id. at 103, 504 P.2d at 677.
102. Russell v. Thompson, 96 Nev. 830, 619 P.2d 537 (1980). See also supra note 75 and
accompanying text. The supreme court rejected congestion, complex issues, and lengthy trials
as exceptional conditions. 96 Nev. at 835-36, 619 P.2d at 540.
103. 298 Ark. 256, 769 S.W.2d 394 (1989).
104. Id. at 257, 769 S.W.2d at 394-95.
105. Id. at 256, 769 S.W.2d at 394.
106. Id. at 257, 769 S.W.2d at 395.
107. Id. at 258, 769 S.W.2d at 395.
108. Id. at 260, 769 S.W.2d at 396.
109. Id.
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master's order specify that the probate judge shall issue final orders
and that the referee lacked authority to issue a final order. 110 The
case record revealed that, except for the first hearing's order, there
was no other record of the master's "recommendations" to the pro-
bate judge."' Upon inspection of the language of the order to deter-
mine whether the judge had reviewed the order signed by the master,
or only co-signed the master's order without appropriate review, the
supreme court concluded that the final order was indeed that of the
master and not that of the judge. "12
The court then considered the propriety of the legislature grant-
ing judges the power to appoint masters possessing the same authority
and powers of those judges. In Jansen v. Blissenbach ' I I the court had
ruled unconstitutional a statute"I4 that allowed a probate referee's or-
der to become final absent a petition for review." 15  The statute had
created, in effect, a deputy probate judge, contrary to the constitu-
tional provision for sole jurisdiction in one judge." 6
The court stressed that its ruling in Jansen was equally applica-
ble to Act 14 of 1987. Act 14 provided that a referee or master should
have all the authority and power as the appointing judge might grant,
except that the referee or master could not issue final orders."t 7 The
net effect, even if unintended, was to create substitute judges contrary
to the provision in the constitution 1 8 that the judge of the probate
court shall try all issues of law and fact. The court declared section 6
of Act 14 of 1987 unconstitutional, and extended it to circuit courts as
well. '19
Under what circumstances then should matters be referred to
special masters? Relying on State v. Nelson, 2° the court reaffirmed
that a lengthy trial, complex issues or calendar congestion were not
grounds for a reference to a master.' 2 ' The court noted that Justice
Hickman, in his concurrence in Walker said that "referees and mas-
110. Id. at 261, 769 S.W.2d at 396.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 262, 769 S.W.2d at 397.
113. 214 Ark. 755, 217 S.W.2d 849 (1949). See supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
114. Act of April 3, 1941, No. 448, 1941 Ark. Acts 1298 (codified at ARK. STAT. ANN.
§§ 22-508 to 511 (1947)). See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
115. 214 Ark. at 760, 217 S.W.2d at 851.
116. Id.
117. Act of Feb. 6,1987, No. 14, 1987 Ark. Acts 24 (in effect until Aug. 1, 1989).
118. ARK. CONST., art. VII, § 34.
119. 298 Ark. at 264, 769 S.W.2d at 398.
120. 246 Ark. 210, 438 S.W.2d 33 (1969). See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
121. 298 Ark. at 264-65, 769 S.W.2d at 398.
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ters are simply substitutes for the judge, and there is no place in any
judicial system for permanent substitutes for judges."' 122 Moreover,
Rule 53 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure expressly requires
some exceptional condition to justify a reference. 123
The court then specifically overruled Fortin v. Parrish to the ex-
tent that it was inconsistent with Hutton.124 In Fortin the court held
that a juvenile master would be considered a de facto judicial officer
whose acts are binding even though his title might originate in legisla-
tion found unconstitutional. 25 The court ruled that the remaining
parts of Act 14 were complete and capable of execution and were not
affected by the decision. 126
The court noted that, in Walker, 27 it ruled the former "Juvenile
Court" unconstitutional. The court said that in response to Walker,
the legislature passed Act 14 of 1987 establishing juvenile divisions of
the circuit and probate courts.' 28  The Arkansas Constitution pro-
vides that the probate courts have such power as is specified or which
is "hereafter prescribed by law."' 29 The court said that the new legis-
lation 131 was in accord with the constitutional power of the legislature
to extend the courts and, therefore, that jurisdiction was proper in the
probate court. 131
In his dissent Justice Steele Hays addressed both the constitu-
tionality and the special master issue. "A cardinal rule of appeal and
error" 32 is that a court ought not to decide a constitutional question
sua sponte when the points were not first presented at the trial. The
justice noted that in at least three instances, the court declined to con-
sider constitutional issues not presented by the litigants at the trial
level. 133
Justice Hays then raised the question of waiver of objection. The
122. Id. at 265, 796 S.W.2d at 399 (citing 291 Ark. at 54, 722 S.W.2d at 564 (Hickman, J.,
concurring)).
123. Ark. R. Civ. P. 53(b).
124. Id., 796 S.W.2d at 399. See Fortin v. Parrish, 258 Ark. 277, 524 S.W.2d 236 (1975),
overruled, 298 Ark. 256, 769 S.W..2d 394 (1988). See also supra notes 68-71 and accompanying
text.
125. 258 Ark. at 283-87, 524 S.W.2d at 239-42.
126. Id. at 266, 769 S.W.2d at 399.
127. 291 Ark. 43, 722 S.W.2d 558 (1987).
128. 298 Ark. at 267, 769 S.W.2d at 400.
129. ARK. CONST., art. VII, § 34.
130. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-1-104 (1987) as to the probate courts and § 16-10-126
(1987) as to chancery and circuit courts.
131. 298 Ark. at 268, 769 S.W.2d at 400.
132. Id. at 269, 769 S.W.2d at 401 (Hays, J., dissenting).
133. Id.
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master had signed eighteen orders over the four years. At no time
until the appeal did the appellants object to or complain about the use
of the master.13 4 Justice Hays said that the courts should have ob-
served the general rule that the objection is waived when an objection
to a master is not made on a timely basis.'35
Justice Hays' last objection went to the finality of the master's
order. The question should have been the judge's subjective recogni-
tion that the judge alone gave finality to the case. Justice Hays saw no
indication that the probate judge did not fully concur in the referee's
findings. It was important to Justice Hays that a final order should
not turn on who drafted it, but on who "reviews, approves, and signs
the order."' 36 The justice concluded his dissent with the observation
that permanent masters are the best suited for juvenile court work,
and that he would have affirmed the probate judges' orders.'37
A short time later, the court decided the Templeton 138 case, in
which the Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) sought a
writ of mandamus to compel two probate judges to hear certain juve-
nile cases. Craighead County Circuit Court Judge Templeton ap-
pointed a master "due to scheduling and other conflicts."'3 9 Benton
County Circuit Court Judge Keith appointed a master because he was
unavailable and the master had previous experience and was familiar
with the juvenile cases before the bar. 'I The DHS contended that
these actions were impermissible violations of Rule 53 and of the di-
rectives of the Hutton decision. 4' The supreme court agreed with the
DHS.
Justice Tom Glaze delivered the majority opinion. The court
pointed out that it had just ruled in Hutton that the probate court's
use of a master went beyond its jurisdiction and that any reference to
a master should be the exception, not the rule. Furthermore, the rul-
ing on the use of masters was in keeping with what it had already
decided in Collins, Gipson and Nelson. 4 2
The court said that it could understand some confusion, given
the long tradition of county court control over juvenile cases. None-
134. Id. at 270, 769 S.W.2d at 401 (Hays, J., dissenting).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 271, 769 S.W.2d at 402 (Hays, J., dissenting).
137. "The ongoing demands of following the progress of a family involving dependent-
neglected children through rehabilitative regimens are far better suited to a master .. " Id.
138. Ark. Dep't of Human Services v. Templeton, 298 Ark. 390, 769 S.W.2d 404 (1989).
139. Id. at 392, 769 S.W.2d at 405.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 391, 769 S.W.2d at 404.
142. Id. at 392, 769 S.W.2d at 405.
1989-901
UALR LAW JOURNAL
theless, full-fledged courts were now hearing juvenile matters, and
those courts are all subject to the Arkansas Rules of Civil Proce-
dure.'4 3 The court noted that Rule 53(b) specifically provides that
only some exceptional condition justifies a reference. Personal un-
availability or a docket conflict are not such exceptions.'" The court
said that judges have remedies in such situations. Arkansas law pro-
vides for temporary assignment of judges,'45 and the Arkansas Consti-
tution provides for temporary replacement of a judge. 4 6 Because
courts handling juvenile matters can avail themselves of the same re-
lief that general jurisdiction courts have always used, there is no justi-
fication for employing a master."'
The court found that the actions of the two judges were clearly
unauthorized and that their justifications were not exceptional condi-
tions under Rule 53. It therefore quashed the orders of appointment
and the orders issued by the masters. 14  The court expressed confi-
dence in the ability of judges now serving to overcome any problems
that arise and asserted that no doubts should remain. The use of mas-
ters is "now contrary to law," and "has been laid to rest by [the]
decision." '
Justice Steele Hays, who dissented in Hutton, concurred some-
what grudgingly. He noted that he still had not changed his view that
masters should be acceptable in juvenile cases, but saw nothing to be
gained by holding on to a view that could no longer prevail. 5 °
Justice John Purtle, part of the majority in Hutton, now dis-
sented. He agreed that the legislature could not give a judge the
power to appoint another person a judge, but had no inkling that the
court would use Hutton to abolish special masters altogether.' 5 ' Say-
ing that the majority was too rigid, Justice Purtle argued that if the
court created Rule 53 it could amend it as well. He said that cases of
dependent-neglected children should have constituted such an excep-
tional condition, and that trial courts should be left some discretion in
carrying out the law.152
In restricting the use of masters, Arkansas has done so abruptly,
143. Id. at 392-93, 769 S.W.2d at 405.
144. Id.
145. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-10-101 (1987).
146. ARK. CONST., art. VII, §§ 21 and 22.
147. 298 Ark. at 393, 769 S.W.2d at 405.
148. Id. at 393, 769 S.W.2d at 406.
149. Id. at 394, 769 S.W.2d at 406.
150. Id. (Hays, J., concurring).
151. Id. at 394-95, 769 S.W.2d at 406 (Purtle, J., dissenting).
152. Id. at 395, 769 S.W.2d at 406-07.
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in the space of only two years. Before Walker in 1987, juvenile mas-
ters were de facto judges because the court was obliged to accept their
findings.' 53 Act 14 then reined in masters by requiring judicial review
of their findings. Only two years later, however, the supreme court
abolished the use of masters in juvenile cases in Hutton, and then ef-
fectively ended the use of masters in any situation with its decision in
Templeton. Yet, in none of these decisions did the court define what
it would consider as exceptional conditions justifying a reference.
Although the court claimed that it was closing the door on masters
because it was simply following the letter of the law in Rule 53(b),
and following the supreme court decision in La Buy,'5 4 it need not
have done so.
The use of masters is, in fact, a wholly local question. Where a
state's courts allow to tolerate more delegation of judicial powers,
there has been no restriction on the use of masters beyond that in the
particular order appointing a master. In Alaska, for example, the re-
strictive language in the civil procedure rules which limits the use of
referees was purposely omitted. 5 In South Carolina, free reference is
allowed,' 56 and the referee has the power of the judge.'57
Even in states where Rule 53 does provide for exceptional condi-
tions, the court may not consider the rule paramount. An Indiana
court of appeals held that a statutory grant to appoint a master super-
seded the Rule 53(b) restriction on the use of masters.5 8 In Missis-
sippi the supreme court refused to scrutinize the "exceptional
conditions" criteria a trial court used. 59
And, even though Arkansas has "laid the matter to rest,"' 6
there still will be situations where the corpse refuses to stay buried. In
civil commitment situations in Arkansas, it is extremely difficult to
153. See supra note 7.
154. La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957); see supra notes 87-91 and accom-
panying text.
155. Dean v. Firor, 681 P.2d 321 (Alaska 1984).
156. S.C. R. Civ. P. 53(b). "[T]he court may . . . direct a reference of all or any of the
issues, whether of fact or law."
157. Id. at 53(c). "Subject to the... limitations... in the order, the master has and shall
exercise the power of the court sitting without a jury .. "
158. Kruse v. Kruse, 464 N.E.2d 934 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984). "[W]hen a master commis-
sioner is properly appointed according to the statute [IND. CODE ANN. § 33-4-1-75.1(b)
(Burns 1985)] .. .T[rial] R[ule] 53 does not apply." Id. at 937.
159. Massey v. Massey, 475 So. 2d 802 (Miss. 1985). Ruling on an appeal from a divorce
proceeding held before a master, the supreme court said "we will not assume that a trial judge
of this state would issue an order of reference without some exceptional condition requiring
it." Id. at 806.
160. 298 Ark. at 394, 769 S.W.2d at 406.
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have a probable cause hearing before a probate judge, bring a person
to the State Hospital for evaluation, and obtain a ruling within the
statutory time limit allowed for such hearings. Until Templeton, the
courts had used a master under standing orders to conduct all hear-
ings. 16  Now, the initial filing must be before the county probate
judge, but each case is handled on an "exceptional condition" basis to
allow a master to make findings and recommendations to be submit-
ted to the court. 162 Unless the state supreme court, prompted either
by another appeal or by the cries of standing judges overwhelmed by
their caseloads, chooses to define or explain "exceptional conditions,"
courts in Arkansas, like those in states such as Colorado and Nevada,
will not be able to use masters except in the traditional matters of
account always permitted by Rule 53.
Richard E. Olszewski
161. Weintraub, State Court Systems May Feel Effects, Ark. Gaz., Mar. 21, 1989, at A5,
col. 1.
162. Telephone interview with J.D. Gingerich, Executive Secretary, Arkansas Judicial De-
partment (June 20, 1989).
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